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ABSTRACT
Atheists are some of the least liked people in the world. Previous
research has demonstrated that in most stigmatized groups, increased
prevalence of the group increases prejudice towards the group. However, the
opposite has been found with atheists- increased perceived prevalence
decreases prejudice towards atheists. One post-hoc explanation provided for this
difference is that since atheists are easily concealable and unorganized as a
group, their greater prevalence may not be perceived as a threat. In the present
thesis, I 1) attempted to replicate the existing finding that perceived increased
prevalence would increase trust towards atheists and 2) directly tested the
hypothesis that if atheist groups are presented as collectively powerful and
coherent, increased prevalence will no longer decrease anti-atheist prejudice. I
did not find support for the hypothesis that prevalence increases atheist trust, nor
did I find support for my hypotheses that power and cohesion would manipulate
distrust. Atheist prejudice is still pervasive, however, prejudice against atheists
may be changing.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Prejudice Against Atheists
Atheists tend to be the least liked people in the world, compared to other
stigmatized groups (Franks & Scherr, 2014). Anti-atheist prejudice is rooted in
distrust of atheists, and has been demonstrated to be a strong and prevalent
form of prejudice (Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011; Gervais, 2011; Gervais,
2013). Typically, prejudice increases as perceived size of the disliked group
increases (Cottrell, & Neuberg, 2005). However, the opposite is true of atheistsincreased perceived number of atheists has been demonstrated to decrease antiatheist prejudice (Gervais, 2011). Gervais (2011) suggested this reversal may be
because atheists are not collectively powerful, coherent, or visible, however, this
has yet to be formally tested. In the present thesis, I tested if the powerlessness,
incoherence, and invisibility of atheists explains why increased prevalence
decreases anti-atheist prejudice.
Approximately 12% of Americans surveyed online do not believe in God
(Gallup Poll, 2017) however, a recent study that quantified non-believers without
directly asking people to label themselves as “atheists” suggests the prevalence
of atheists in the United States may be as high as 26% (Gervais & Najle, 2018).
Individuals who self-identify as agnostic or atheist report experiencing
discrimination (Cragun, Kosmin, Keysar, Hammer, & Nielsen, 2012). They report

1

experiencing different types of discrimination like denial of services, being the
victim of a hate crime, and social ostracism (Hammer, Cragun, Hwang, & Smith,
2012). Consistent with earlier research findings that high group identification
buffers against the psychological consequences of discrimination (Branscombe,
Schmitt & Harvey, 1999), stronger group identification buffers against some of
the negative psychological effects of discrimination in atheists as well (Doane &
Elliot, 2015). In these ways, anti-atheist prejudice is similar to other forms of
prejudice.
The sociofunctional approach to understanding out-group prejudice
provides one explanation for anti-atheist prejudice. The sociofunctional approach
argues that motivation for preferential in-group treatment influences people to
behave prejudicially toward out-group members (Brewer, 1999). This approach
postulates that individuals may have different responses to members of different
out-groups based on the particular threat that out-group poses. For example, in a
study of emotional responses to different out-groups, participants demonstrated
prejudice against feminists, fundamentalist Christians, and gay men; however,
they had different emotional reactions to each group. Participants reported
feeling more disgust towards gay men, and more anger and resentment towards
fundamentalist Christians and feminists. These groups were perceived to have
unique threats. Feminists were perceived to be a threat towards social
coordination while fundamentalist Christians were perceived to be a threat to
freedoms. These emotions that trigger prejudicial responses may be adaptive in
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ensuring that one’s in-group is well-provided for (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). The
motivation to respond negatively to out-group members stems from the desire to
ensure preferential treatment towards the in-group. Atheists are perceived as
posing a threat to morals and social cooperation (Gervais, Shariff & Norenzayan,
2011). Understanding this unique threat may be useful in understanding unique
features of anti-atheist prejudice.
Studies of stereotypes about atheists held by non-believers support the
sociofunctional approach to understanding anti-atheist prejudice. After being
primed with religious words, believers demonstrated more negative attitudes
towards value violating groups (like homosexuals and atheists). This relationship
persisted after controlling for participant’s self-reported religiosity. This suggests
that group membership is part of what motivates anti-atheist prejudice (Johnson,
Rowatt & LaBouff, 2012). Harper (2007) found that common negative
stereotypes held by college-aged believers about non-believers included beliefs
that they were hard-headed, cynical, daring, rebellious, faithless, and
argumentative. These traits were not attributed to other stigmatized groups or
other religious minorities. This suggests atheists are perceived as posing a
unique threat to believers, and that may drive discrimination and prejudice.
However, anti-atheist prejudice is a particularly strong form of prejudice, and it is
not limited to religious individuals. While other stigmatized groups in America
have become increasingly more accepted over the last few decades, atheists
continue to be increasingly disliked. Using data from Gallup polls, Edgell, Gerteis,
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and Hartmann (2006) identified that atheists are less likely to be openly accepted
than any other religious, ethnic, and sexual minority group.
Furthermore, atheists were the group that differed most from participants’
“vision of American society,” and atheists were the group they would disapprove
most of if their children were to marry. To further understand why people dislike
atheists, Gervais, Shariff, and Norenzayan (2011) used vignettes of an
untrustworthy person to measure the conjunction fallacy, in which negative
attributes are associated with a particular kind of person. They found that
participants were more likely to attribute untrustworthy characteristic to an atheist
than they were to other stigmatized groups. This demonstrated that other
stigmatized groups are disliked (homosexuals, feminists, liberals, etc.), but are
trusted more than atheists. Giddings & Dunn (2016) conducted a study using the
same methodology but they included assessments of the respondents’ religious
identification. They found that although non-religious people made fewer
conjunction errors, they still maintained greater distrust of atheists than of
religious people. This suggests that atheist prejudice is robust in that it
generalizes across judgments about atheists. While out-group threat may explain
some of the prejudice atheists experience, it does not fully explain it (Giddings &
Dunn, 2016).
Distrust in atheists may originate from a moral distrust. Moral distrust
occurs when an individual expects another individual or group of people to not
behave pro-socially. Moral distrust operates under the assumption that someone
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who does not believe in God may act immorally because they do not believe in a
socially monitoring all-knowing power who encourages pro-sociality, which would
then encourage prosocial behavior in believers (Gervais, 2013). Such distrust
may be founded. Shariff and Norenzayan (2011) demonstrated that participants
who believed in a punitive God, compared to a loving God, were less likely to
cheat on a test that would display the correct answer to participants if they did
not take action to not see the answer. This suggests that belief in a punitive God
does increase rule following and promotes pro-sociality. Other studies support
the notion that people’s intuitions are that non-believers are less likely to be
prosocial. For example, Simpson and Rios (2017) had participants write a list of
core moral values that an atheist would hold and analyzed ratings of perceived
atheist morals. They found that anti-atheist prejudice is explained by the fear that
atheists will not act kindly or caring towards others. Swan and Heesacker (2012)
tested whether the term atheist itself had negative connotations or if it was the
non-belief in God that influenced distrust. They demonstrated that it was the nonbelief in God that made even likeable individuals untrustworthy, rather than the
atheist label itself. This further suggests that religion is used as a cue to
trustworthiness. The belief that since atheists do not believe in a socially
monitoring God they will not behave pro-socially, and will not cooperate,
motivates distrust (Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008; Shariff, Norenzayan, 2011).
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Factors that Reduce Anti-Atheist Prejudice
Researchers have demonstrated three contexts that decrease atheist
distrust: interaction with atheists, the presence of secular authority, and
increased atheist prevalence. Researchers have tested how imagined
interactions with atheists affects prejudice towards them. After imaging an
interaction with an atheist, compared to the control group who thought only about
atheists, but not interacting with them, participants reported less distrust, more
willingness to cooperate with, and more willingness to engage with an atheist
(LaBouff & Ledoux, 2016). This research demonstrates that perceived interaction
decreased prejudice against atheists.
The presence of secular rule of law also has been shown to reduce antiatheist prejudice. Since atheist distrust stems from the perception that a socially
monitoring God is necessary for prosociality, distrust towards atheists may be
reduced if people perceive that secular organizations are also sources of social
monitoring. When participants watched a video regarding secular authority, they
demonstrated less distrust of atheists than did participants who watched a control
video or did not watch a video (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012). Furthermore, in
countries with strong secular authorities, negative attitudes towards atheists are
less common than in regions with weaker secular authorities (Norenzayan &
Gervais, 2015). Reminders of secular authority may decrease prejudice against
atheists because it demonstrates that secular institutions can also provide social
monitoring and enforce pro-social behavior.
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Finally, atheist distrust also reduces when perceived prevalence of
atheism increases. Gervais (2011) conducted four studies analyzing the effects
of atheist prevalence on anti-atheist prejudice. Using a diverse sample of 54
countries, the first study established that in countries with high atheist
prevalence, prejudice against atheists was lower at an international level. This
correlational relationship was still significant after controlling for socioeconomic
development and differences between individualist and collectivist cultures. The
second study established that high atheist prevalence was negatively associated
with atheist prejudice at the individual level. This relationship was still significant
after controlling for belief in God and belief in a dangerous world. The third study
provided causal evidence that perceived atheist prevalence reduces anti-atheist
prejudice. Participants read that local atheist prevalence was either high or low.
High atheist prevalence was associated with lower explicit distrust. Finally, in the
fourth study Gervais employed the IAT (Greenwald, McGee &Schwartz, 1998) to
show that when prevalence was high, implicit distrust against atheists decreased.
These results demonstrated that high atheist prevalence reduces prejudice and
distrust of atheists.
This finding is a reversal from how perceived group prevalence typically
affects prejudice. Other research has demonstrated that greater the perceived
group size, the greater the prejudice (Cottrell, & Neuberg, 2005). Larger groups
size generally equates with perceiving a greater threat. For example, in an effort
to understand prejudice towards immigrants, researchers found that Dutch
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citizens who perceived large immigrant population size also held anti-immigrant
attitudes and felt their group interests were threatened (Schlueter & Scheepers,
2010). Similarly, Quillian (1995) demonstrated that perceived group threat
towards immigrants is associated with group size, and as group size increases
so does prejudicial attitudes towards immigrants. Gervais (2011) argued that
since atheists are not visible, powerful, nor collectively coherent, increased
atheist prevalence would not equate with increased threat. Atheists are not
united in their lack of belief because this lack of belief can originate from a variety
of sources (Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013). Similarly, atheists tend to report low
in-group identification compared to religious groups, which may influence their
lack of group coherence or organization (Ysseldyk, Haslam, Matheson, &
Anisman, 2012). Atheists are easily concealable (they cannot be identified
through outward appearance), which makes their self-disclosure their only
identifying characteristic. Information that atheists are prevalent communicates to
people that the existence of many atheists will not negatively affect their social or
moral systems. Thus, it may be that people are less distrustful of them when they
are presented as being high in numbers.
The explanation for the reduction of atheist distrust, in response to
information about high atheist prevalence, operates on the assumption that
atheists as a group are not collectively coherent or powerful. In the present study,
I manipulated participants’ perceptions of the coherence and collective power of
atheists to determine if this explains why increased prevalence reduces distrust
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toward atheists. I also explored the potential covarying effects of political
orientation on the relationship between prevalence and atheist distrust. It may be
that individuals who are more conservative are less likely to trust atheists than
individuals who are more liberal. I also explored the potential mediating effects of
belief in God, as Gervais (2011) did, religious importance, and the belief that
atheists are the cause of moral decline in society. The goals of the present study
were twofold: First, I attempted to replicate Gervais’ finding that increased
prevalence reduces prejudice. Second, I intended to extend these findings by
demonstrating that increased prevalence only decreases distrust if atheists are
perceived as not collectively coherent or powerful. I tested the following
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: If no information about the collective coherence of atheists
is provided, increased prevalence will increase trust of atheists.
Hypothesis 2: If atheists are described as collectively incoherent and not
powerful, increased prevalence will increase trust of atheists, similar to if no
information is provided.
Hypothesis 3: If atheists are described as collectively coherent and
powerful, increased prevalence will increase atheist distrust.
Hypothesis 4: Belief that atheists are the cause of moral decline in society
will mediate the relationship between prevalence, power and coherence, and
atheist distrust.
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CHAPTER TWO
PILOT DATA

Gervais (2011) participants’ read a report about atheist prevalence relative
to other groups on their university campus and worldwide. Prevalence was
manipulated to be either high or low. Respondents indicated their distrust
towards atheists, religiosity, general feelings towards atheists, and perceived
contact with atheists. I used a similar study design, stimuli, and outcome
measures to test my hypotheses. Following Gervais’ (2011) procedure, I
conducted a pilot study of perceived atheist prevalence in the sample population
to generate “high” and “low” prevalence values.
Gervais (2011) collected pilot data to create an average of student
perceptions of atheists and then manipulated that average for high and low
atheist prevalence number. Gervais asked participants to provide a percentage
estimate of atheist prevalence at their university. Approximately forty percent of
his participants estimated that the university had five percent or fewer atheists,
and less than five percent of his participants estimated an atheist prevalence of
above thirty percent. On average, his participants reported a perceived atheist
prevalence of about twelve percent (11.45%,SD = 9.49%). He decided to use fifty
percent in his manipulated report to operationalize high prevalence, and five
percent to represent low prevalence, arguing that these estimates would be quite
high and realistically low respectively.
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I collected my own pilot data to survey student’s perception of different
group’s prevalence. 111 (86 females) students reported their percentage
estimate of each of the following groups: Atheists, vegans, Buddhists, and Jews.
Participants reported they thought atheists to be more common than Gervais’
participants (M=27%, SD=19%). This is contrary to Gervais’ pilot data; in which
forty percent of Gervais’ participant’s estimated atheist prevalence to be below
thirty percent, and only five percent of his participants estimated prevalence to be
above thirty percent. Participants in the lowest quartile reported atheists to make
up ten percent of the university’s population, while participants in the highest
quartile reported atheists at forty percent. Only about thirteen percent (12.6%) of
my participants estimated that the university had five percent or fewer atheists,
and almost seventy percent (65.8%) estimated an atheist prevalence above thirty
percent.
Our participants believed atheists to be more prevalent than Gervais’
(2011) participants, so five percent atheist prevalence would still be a good low.
Our participants did not believe atheists to be more than fifty percent prevalent.
Because of this, I decided to use Gervais (2011) original manipulated prevalence
of five percent of low atheist prevalence and fifty percent for high atheist
prevalence.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHOD

Participants
G-power analysis revealed that for a small effect size of, ηp2 = .04 (p <
.05), a sample of, n = 200 participants will be needed to obtain statistical power
at the recommended .80 level (Cohen, 1988). However, due to a large attention
check fail rate of forty eight percent in the first data collection period, I recollected
data with new quality detectors and increased my sample to 450 participants. In
the first data collection period, I collected data from 305 participants, of which
170 participants (males= 63) passed attention checks. The majority of these
participants indicated being Latino or Hispanic (69%), and were, on average, 20
years old (median= 19, range: 18-51). In the second data collection period, I
added participants to ensure that after exclusion, based on attention check
failure, I would maintain satisfactory power in all six of my conditions. I collected
data from 220 participants, of which 181 (males = 19) participants passed
attention checks. The majority of these participants indicated being Latino or
Hispanic (70%), and were, on average 23.5 years old (median = 22, range: 1855). After combining both data collection periods and excluding participants who
failed attention checks (n = 149), data from 350 participants were used in
analysis. The majority of participants were female (n = 286) and identified as
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Hispanic (n = 246), with a mean age of 21.84 years (Median = 20, age range: 1855).
To mask the study goals and hypotheses, participants were told that they
were reading news articles about different groups on the university campus. At
the end of the study participants were debriefed with the true purpose of the
study. There were no gender or major restrictions on participation. All
participants were recruited online through the Department of Psychology Subject
Pool SONA site and redirected to Qualtrics to complete the study. Upon
completion of the study, participants were compensated 0.5 unit of credit to be
granted towards a psychology course of their choosing. This study was approved
by CSUSB psychology department’s Institutional Review Board (IRB).

Measures
Atheist Prevalence and Power/Coherence Manipulation
Participants read one of six news articles adapted from Gervais (2011)
that described atheist prevalence, power, and coherence. Half of the articles
claimed that atheist prevalence worldwide and at the participant’s university was
high (10% worldwide and 50% on campus) and half claimed that prevalence was
low (rare worldwide and 10% on campus). Gervais’s original stimuli contained no
information about atheist power/coherence. Two of the articles were almost
identical to Gervais’ (2011) and only provided information about prevalence
(high/low). I altered the university name to be that of the participants in my study.
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I edited the additional four articles to include explicit information about atheist
power and coherence as a group and each article represented a different
experimental condition (high prevalence/high power and coherence, high
prevalence/low power and coherence, low prevalence/high power and
coherence, low prevalence/low power and coherence; Appendix A).
Atheist Distrust
I used two scales of atheist prejudice. The first was a two-item distrust
measure that Gervais (2011) used. Participants rated the items “Atheists are
dishonest,” and, “Atheists are trustworthy.” on a seven-point scale (-3= strongly
disagree, 3= strongly agree). I reverse scored the first item and took the average
of the two items to compute the variable atheist distrust (α = .72). On average,
across conditions, participants did not find atheists to be particularly distrustful (M
= -1.05, SD = 1.46).
I also used The Negative Attitudes Towards Atheists scale as a second
measure of atheist distrust (Gervais & Shariff, 2010). This scale includes seven
items that measure explicit anti-atheist prejudice. Items include, “In times of crisis
I am more inclined to trust people who are religious,” “I would be uncomfortable
with an atheist teaching my child,” and “Societies function better if everyone
believes in God.” I took the average of the items to compute the negative
attitudes towards atheist measure, I found the atheist distrust scale to be valid (α
= .72, M = 26.86, SD = 7.88).
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Gervais’ (2011) assumption was that atheist threat was explaining why
prevalence effects atheist distrust. I included an item to directly assess how
threatening participants perceived atheists as a group. Participants rated their
agreement on the following item, “Atheists are not a threat as a group (M = 2.00,
SD = 0.87; seven-point scale, -3= strongly disagree, 3=strongly agree).
Atheists are the Cause of Moral Decline
To asses if participants believed that atheists are one cause of moral
decline in society and if that influenced their distrust of atheists, participants
responded to one item: “Atheists are one cause of moral decline in society” and
rated their agreement on a seven-point scale (M = -1.10, SD = 1.58;-3= strongly
disagree and 3= strongly agree).
Religious Belief
To assess if belief in God moderated the relationship between prevalence
and distrust, participants responded to the following item, “I believe in God,” on a
scale of -3 (strongly disagree) to 3 (strongly agree). To assess if religious
importance impacted the relationship between prevalence and distrust,
participants rated their agreement with the following: “My religion is important to
me” (seven-point scale, -3= strongly disagree, 3= strongly agree).
On average, participants reported having a strong belief in God (M = 1.84,
SD = 1.83), with about eighty percent (80.40%) of participants indicating at least
some belief in God (a score of 1 or greater). The majority of participants indicated
that their religion was of importance to them (M = 1.23, SD = 1.83), with almost
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seventy percent (69.80%) of participants indicating that their religion is at least
somewhat important to them (a score of one or greater).
Political Orientation
To asses if political orientation moderated the relationship between
prevalence and atheist distrust, participants responded to three items: “I tend to
be more liberal than I am conservative” and “I tend to be more conservative than
I am liberal.” I reverse-scored the first item and took the average of these two
items to create a composite measure of political conservatism (α = .88; sevenpoint scale, -3= strongly disagree, 3= strongly agree). On average, participants
reported being less conservative than they were liberal (M = 3.52, SD = 1.69).
Participants also indicted their political party by choosing one of the
following options: Democratic, Republican, No party affiliation, and prefer not to
answer. The majority of participants identified as democratic (n = 211), however
100 participants chose to not disclose their party affiliation (Republican n = 41).
Alternative Explanations
Gervais (2011) collected a number of measures to rule out alternative
explanations, I collected the same measures in the case that I replicated his
prevalence decreasing distrust finding.
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Perceived Contact. Participants responded to an open-ended prompt
asking them how many atheists they know (Gervais, 2011). On average,
participants claimed to know around three atheists (Median = 2.00, SD = 4.93).
Then participants rated their agreement (-3 = strongly disagree, 3 = strongly
agree) to the following statements, “I often come into contact with atheists,” and
“I rarely come into contact with atheists” (Gervais, 2011). I reverse coded the
item “I rarely come into contact with atheists” and took the average of the two
items to compute the scale: atheist contact (α = .89) Participants did not report
frequently coming into contact with atheists (M = 6.79, SD = 3.84).
General Attitudes. I measured attitudes towards atheists using a standard
0-100 “feeling thermometer.” Where participants rated the warmth or coldness
they felt towards atheists (lower scores indicate colder feelings). Participants did
not report particularly cold, nor warm feelings towards atheists (M = 57.85, SD =
23.17).
Manipulation Checks
Prevalence Manipulation Check. Participants rated a single-item measure
stating, “Atheists are very common” on a seven-point scale (-3= strongly
disagree, 3= strongly agree).
Power/Cohesion Manipulation Check. The following two items assessed
atheist cohesion and power: “Atheists are becoming powerful as a group” and
“Atheists are becoming cohesive as a group”. Participants rated these
statements on a seven-point scale (-3= strongly disagree, 3=strongly agree).
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS

Data Screening
Outliers
Outliers were identified using z-scores greater than or equal to, z = 3.3, p
< .001. No outliers were identified using this criterion.
Normality
Normality was determined by taking the z-scores of skewness and
kurtosis and by using the criteria, z = 3.3, p < .001. Using this criteria, normality
for all variables was assumed.

Manipulation Checks
There was a significant effect of prevalence on the belief that atheists are
common, F(1, 350) = 351.22, p < .001. Participants in the low prevalence
conditions were more likely to believe that atheists were less common (M = -1.22,
SD = 1.88) than participants in the high prevalence conditions, who believed
atheists were more common (M = 1.94, SD = 1.25). This indicates that the stimuli
were effective in influencing participant’s perceptions about atheist prevalence.
There was a significant effect of power and coherence on the belief that
atheists are powerful, F(1, 350) = 53.73, p < .001, and the belief that atheists are
cohesive, F(1, 350) = 63.55, p < .001. Participants in the atheist in the high
18

power and cohesion conditions were more likely to believe that atheists were
powerful (M = 0.62, SD = 1.70) and cohesive as a group (M = 0.82, SD = 1.35)
than participants in the low power and cohesion group who believed atheists
were less powerful (M = -0.80, SD = 1.75) and cohesive (M = -0.54, SD = 1.61).
This indicates that my power and cohesion conditions adequately influenced
participant’s beliefs about atheist power and group coherence.

Tests of Hypotheses 1-3
To test Hypotheses 1-3, I implemented a 3 (Group Organization: high, low,
no information control) X 2 (Prevalence: high, low) study design. I took the
average of the two items: atheists are trustworthy (reverse coded) and atheists
are dishonest to compute the variable: atheist distrust, as Gervais (2011) did.
The model was not significant, F(5, 350) = 0.98, p > .05. The main effect of
prevalence was not significant, F(1,350) = 0.87, p > .05. The main effect of group
organization was also not significant, F(1,350) = 0.61, p > .05. The interaction
between prevalence and group organization was also not significant, F(1,350) =
0.08, p > 0.05. There were no significant differences in atheist distrust scores
across the six groups (Table 1). Therefore, I did not find support for Hypotheses
1-3.

Table 1. Means and standard deviations of atheist distrust across conditions
Organization
High

Prevalence High
Mean SD
2.62 1.15
19

Prevalence Low
Mean
SD
2.77
1.18

Low
No Information

2.56
2.52

0.94
0.91

2.64
2.88

1.22
1.21

I conducted the same 3x2 ANOVA using scores on the Negative Attitudes
Towards Atheists Scale as the dependent variable. Again, I did not find support
for Hypotheses 1-3. The model was not significant, F(5,350) = 0.41, p >.05. The
main effect of prevalence was not significant, F(1,350) = 0.16, p >. 05 . The main
effect of group organization was also not significant, F(1,350) = 1.26, p > 0.05 .
The interaction between prevalence and group organization was also not
significant, F(1,350) = 0.67, p > .05 . There were no significant differences in
negative attitudes towards atheists scores across the six groups (Table 2).

Table 2. Negative attitudes towards atheists across conditions

Organization
High
Low
No Information

Prevalence High
Mean
SD
3.91
1.13
3.66
1.20
3.87
1.11

Prevalence Low
Mean
SD
3.86
1.06
3.82
1.16
3.82
1.13

I conducted the same 3x2 ANOVA using Atheists are a threat as the
dependent variable. Again, I did not find support for Hypotheses 1-3. The model
was not significant, F(5,350) = 0.68, p > .05. The main effect of prevalence was
not significant, F(1,350) = 0.03, p > .05 . The main effect of group organization
was also not significant, F(1,350) = 0.72, p > .05 . The interaction between
prevalence and group organization was also not significant, F(1,350) = 0.57, p
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>.05 . There were no significant differences in negative attitudes towards atheists
scores across the six groups (Table 3).

Table 3. Atheists are a threat across conditions

Organization
High
Low
No Information

Prevalence High
Mean SD
2.06 0.86
1.90 0.90
1.41 1.60

Prevalence Low
Mean
SD
2.00
0.86
1.99
0.87
1.35
1.68

Hypothesis 4
Because there was no evidence of a relationship between prevalence or
power and coherence and trust, there was no reason to test Hypothesis four, as
the function of Hypothesis 4 was to test a mediator of the relationship between
prevalence/power/coherence and trust.

Covariates
I tested three potential covariates using the two-item atheist distrust
composite as the outcome variable and prevalence and power/coherence as
predictors in a 3x2 ANCOVA design. None of the potential covariates were
significantly correlated with atheist distrust: Belief in God (r = -.04, p > .05),
religious importance (r = .01, p > .05), and, political conservatism, (r = .10, p >
.05). Belief in God did not significantly correlate with prevalence within conditions
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(r = .03, p > .05). However, political conservatism was nearly significant in the
ANCOVA.
I ran an ANCOVA to test the hypothesis that political orientation
significantly affected the relationship between prevalence, power and coherence
and atheist distrust. Political conservatism significantly covaried with atheist
distrust, F(1, 350) = 4.08, p < .05. However, Political conservatism did not
significantly affect the relationship between prevalence, power and coherence
and atheist distrust, F(5, 350) = 0.937, p > .05. The main effect of prevalence
was not significant, F(5, 350) = 0.08, p > .05. The main effect of organization was
not significant, F(5, 350) = 0.20, p > .05. The interaction between prevalence and
organization was not significant, F(5, 350) = 0.18, p > .05. Political conservatism
was not a significant covariate.
Controlling for belief in God did not significantly affect the relationship
between prevalence, coherence and power and atheist distrust, F(5, 350) 1.17,
p > .05. The main effect of prevalence was not significant, F(1, 350) = 0.02, p >
.05. The main effect of organization was not significant, F(1, 350) = .21, p > .05.
The interaction between prevalence and organization was not significant, F(1,
350) = .15, p > .05. Belief in God was not a significant covariate.
Controlling for religious importance did not significantly affect the
relationship between prevalence, power and coherence and atheist distrust, F(5,
350) = 1.05, p > .05. The main effect of prevalence was not significant, F(5, 350)
= 0.08, p > .05. The main effect of organization was not significant, F(5, 350) =
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0.14, p > .05. The interaction between prevalence and organization was not
significant, F(5, 350) = 0.12, p > .05. Religious importance was not a significant
covariate.

Table 4. Political Conservatism as a covariate across conditions

Organization
High
Low
No Information

Prevalence High
Mean SD
2.06 0.86
1.90 0.90
1.41 1.60
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Prevalence Low
Mean
SD
2.00
0.86
1.99
0.87
1.35
1.68

CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION

I investigated factors that may influence trust, a unique form of prejudice,
towards atheists. Specifically, I attempted to replicate Gervais (2011) finding that
perceived increased atheist prevalence decreased distrust towards atheists. I
hypothesized that because atheists are not powerful nor cohesive as a group,
they do not pose a threat when participants perceive there to be more of them.
Therefore, if participates were lead to believe that atheists are collectively
powerful and coherent, the positive effects of increased prevalence would
dissipate. If participants perceived there to be few atheists who are collectively
powerful and cohesive, their distrust of atheists should increase. I hypothesized
that political orientation may covary the relationship between prevalence and
distrust, specifically that individuals who are more conservative may distrust
atheists more than individuals who are liberal.
Although the false news manipulation was successful in convincing
participants that atheists were either prevalent or not and either powerful and
coherent or not, I did not replicate Gervais (2011) finding that increased atheist
prevalence decreases atheist distrust. I did not find support for my hypotheses
that increased power and coherence would increase atheist distrust.
I found that atheist prejudice is not influenced by atheist prevalence,
atheist power or atheist coherence. A number of factors could explain my finding.
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First, it may be that atheists pose threats unique to their individual characteristic
and not their group size. It may be that disbelief in God, and therefore the
assumption that an individual will not behave prosocially, is equally threatening
individually and in larger numbers. Therefore, participant’s perceptions of atheist
group size may not matter. ne atheist may pose the same perceived threat to
prosociality and group cooperation as a group of many atheists may. It may only
take one individual to pose a large threat to cooperation, therefore, it may be
more realistic for participants to only focus on the feasibility of one individual
behaving non-prosocial.
Another possibility is that Gervais’ (2011) original finding was a nonreplicable false positive. The replication crisis, which came to fruition in 2012, has
caused debate, concern, and within recent years, close examination amongst
psychologists. There have been a number of proposed causes for the replication
crisis within social psychology. The file drawer problem, a term penned by
Rosenthal (1979), proposes that failed psychology studies are rarely, if ever,
published. The field of social psychology tends to only acknowledge significant
findings while non-significant findings are stored in the “file drawer”. Therefore,
psychologists have little incentive to seek publication for non-significant findings.
There have been fewer replication studies in recent years, highlighting the
problem that only inventive and significant research is valued (Pashler &
Wagenmakers, 2012). While Gervais (2011) was able to replicate his own
findings, I did not succeed. Gervais (2011, Study 4) replicated his findings that
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experimentally manipulating participant’s perceived prevalence of atheists
decreased distrust independent of atheist contact. He even expanded upon these
findings by demonstrating that participant’s implicit distrust towards atheists were
reduced when they were lead to believe that atheists were more common. It is
important to note that the first two studies he conducted were correlational in
nature- he observed a relationship between prevalence and distrust, and was
only able to experimentally replicate prevalence decreasing distrust in one study.
Therefore, he replicated his own findings in the final study he conducted. There is
no evidence in the literature to suggest that there has been a replication of these
findings since.
Another explanation for my null findings is that as atheists become more
recognizable and prevalent in society (Gallup Polls, 2017), atheist distrust may
be decreasing. My study was conducted 7 years after the publication of Gervais’
study. A recent pew research survey found adults under fifty years old, are less
likely to believe in a biblical God. These younger adults are also less likely to
believe in a God or higher spiritual power (although, belief in God is still more
common than disbelief), they are also less likely to subscript to a particular
religion or denomination (Pew Research, 2018). It may be that since younger
people tend not to identify with a particular religion and instead are more likely to
believe in a higher power or God, they may not view atheists as such a
threatening outgroup, compared to other groups.
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My sample mirrored Gervais (2011) sample in many ways: I collected data
from a population of university students and the majority of my participants were
female. However, my participants varied in two critical ways. First, many of my
participants failed attention checks and had to be excluded from the study, which
brings concern to the efficacy of the data. I had hoped to address this issue by
informing participants they would only be compensated if they passed the
attention checks. Second, due to differences between atheist prevalence belief
between Gervais (2011) participants, and my own, it may be that my participants
were less prejudiced against atheists. In my pilot data collection, I found that
students believed atheists to be more prevalent on average, than students at the
University of Kentucky. It may be that prevalence did not increase trust because
participants already believed atheists to be prevalent. This may result in their
atheist prejudice being unaffected by atheist prevalence.
In an attempt to understand why my manipulation of power and coherence
was unsuccessful in increasing or decreasing prejudice, I propose that it may
have been informative to measure distrust towards atheists before the presence
of the manipulation. By taking a premeasure of atheist distrust, I may have been
able to determine if participants were greatly or slightly prejudiced towards
atheists, resulting in a ceiling or floor effect, explaining why my replication was
not successful. In an attempt to understand why my manipulation of prevalence
was unsuccessful in influencing prevalence, I propose that individual uncontrolled
differences between samples may have produced non-significant results, as
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discussed above. Also, with my current study design I was not able to asses if
there was any effect of my manipulation on participant’s implicit prejudice
towards atheists.

Implications
As this research suggests, one avenue for successfully decreasing atheist
distrust may not be a viable option for decreasing prejudice towards atheists.
Atheist distrust may be more complicated and multifaceted than previous
research suggests. Therefore, finding a one pill cures all solution may not be
feasible. Other methods of decreasing atheist distrust must be explored.
For this study, it may be that other factors are reducing atheist prejudice,
nulling the effect of prevalence on distrust. Previous research has demonstrated
that reminders of secular authority decrease atheist prejudice (Gervais &
Norenzayan, 2012). These participants live in a fairly liberal area with a strong
secular presence. It may be that my participants perceived secular authority to be
strong, and therefore the prevalence manipulation to decrease their prejudice did
not work.
This study also demonstrates the importance and vitality of testing
replication hypotheses and attempting to expand on those hypotheses. While
Gervais (2011) was able to replicate his result across two experimental studies,
we were not. This suggests that the initial result on prevalence decreasing
distrust may have had temporal, locational, or other interfering confounds. The
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replication crisis is slowly being addressed, however, the field must provide
incentives and motivation for researchers to replicate their colleagues work.

Conclusions
This research attempted to replicate a finding that resulted in decreased
distrust towards atheists. I attempted to explain the underlining mechanism that
resulted in the decreased prejudice. Instead, I discovered a potentially
nonreplicable result. This failed replication may be due to shifting social
perceptions about atheists, differing prevalence perceptions of atheists, or that
atheists are becoming more recognizable in society. Other mechanisms need to
be explored to attempt to explain anti atheist prejudice, and by explaining anti
atheist prejudice, factors to reduce it can be discovered.
Gervais (2011) suggested that accurately reflecting the increasing
prevalence of atheists may increase trust towards them. However, my research
suggests that this may not be the case. It may be that accurately reflecting
prejudice does little or nothing to reduce distrust. Perhaps it may be that
informing individuals’ of atheist prevalence can make atheists seem “pushy” with
their disbelief, as Gervais (2013) noted as a potential limitation of publically
exposing atheist prevalence. The literature on atheist distrust is sparse, even
though the number of self-identifying atheists has grown in the last decades.
More literature is needed to explore current attitudes towards atheists and the
mechanisms that drive distrust towards atheists. By discovering and exploring
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these mechanisms efforts can be made to continue to decrease the general
public’s prejudice and distrust towards atheists.
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APPENDIX A
MANIPULATED NEWS ARTICLES
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Atheist prevalence worldwide and at the University: Common and
Cohesive/Powerful
Worldwide Atheism Rates
It can be quite difficult to determine how common atheists (people who do not
believe in God) are around the world. However, Philip Zuckerman has combed
through a great deal of sociological research, and his results are striking.
Zuckerman estimates that there are between 500 million and 700 million atheists
in the world. That is nearly 10% of the world's population. Globally, atheists are
58 times more numerous than Mormons, 41 times more numerous than Jews,
and twice as numerous as Buddhists; nonbelievers constitute the fourth largest
religious group in the world, trailing only Christians, Muslims, and Hindus. He
also reported that atheists have become more cohesive and politically powerful
as a group. They have formed organizations in most Western cities and each
year an increasing number of atheists is elected to political office. They report
being interested in changing social policy and criminal justice systems to better fit
their ideals (Zuckerman, 2007).
CSUSB Psychology Atheism Rates
Within the CSUSB psychology department, we have conducted numerous
studies on peoples’ religious beliefs. Using these data, we find that atheists are
incredibly common. Aggregating across a number of separate studies, we find
that approximately 50% of students indicate that they do not believe in God.
These students have an active atheist group on campus, meet regularly, and
atheist students are active in student governance.
Clearly, atheists are very common.
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Atheist prevalence worldwide and at the University: Common and non-cohesive/
not powerful
Worldwide Atheism Rates
It can be quite difficult to determine how common atheists (people who do not
believe in God) are around the world. However, Philip Zuckerman has combed
through a great deal of sociological research, and his results are striking.
Zuckerman estimates that there are between 500 million and 700 million atheists
in the world. That is nearly 10% of the world's population. Globally, atheists are
58 times more numerous than Mormons, 41 times more numerous than Jews,
and twice as numerous as Buddhists; nonbelievers constitute the fourth largest
religious group in the world, trailing only Christians, Muslims, and Hindus. He
also reported that atheists not become cohesive or politically powerful as a
group. There are very few atheist organizations in most Western cities and very
few atheists are elected to political office. (Zuckerman, 2007).
CSUSB Psychology Atheism Rates
Within the CSUSB psychology department, we have conducted numerous
studies on peoples’ religious beliefs. Using these data, we find that atheists are
incredibly common. Aggregating across a number of separate studies, we find
that approximately 50% of students indicate that they do not believe in God.
However, these students do not have an active atheist group on campus, do not
meet regularly, and are unlikely to be active in student governance.
Clearly, atheists are very common.
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Atheist prevalence worldwide and at the University: Uncommon and noncohesive/ not powerful
Worldwide Atheism Rates
It can be quite difficult to determine how common atheists (people who do not
believe in God) are around the world. Compared to the great world religions,
atheists are fairly rare, and do not have a particularly visible worldwide presence.
And, according to data from Norris and Inglehart (2006), atheists are becoming
less common worldwide, relative to other religious groups. They also reported
that atheists not become cohesive or politically powerful as a group. There are
very few atheist organizations in most Western cities and very few atheists are
elected to political office (Zuckerman, 2007).
CSUSB Psychology Atheism Rates
Within the CSUSB psychology department, we have conducted numerous
studies on peoples’ religious beliefs. Using these data, we find that atheists are
fairly uncommon. Aggregating across a number of separate studies, we find that
only about 5% of students indicate that they are atheists. These students do not
have an active atheist group on campus, do not meet regularly, and are unlikely
to be active in student governance.
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Atheist prevalence worldwide and at the University: Uncommon and cohesive/
Powerful
Worldwide Atheism Rates
It can be quite difficult to determine how common atheists (people who do not
believe in God) are around the world. Compared to the great world religions,
atheists are fairly rare, and do not have a particularly visible worldwide presence.
And, according to data from Norris and Inglehart (2006), atheists are becoming
less common worldwide, relative to other religious groups. They also reported
that atheists have become more cohesive and politically powerful as a group.
They have formed organizations in most Western cities and each year an
increasing number of atheists is elected to political office. They report being
interested in changing social policy and criminal justice systems to better fit their
ideals.
CSUSB Psychology Atheism Rates
Within the CSUSB psychology department, we have conducted numerous
studies on peoples’ religious beliefs. Using these data, we find that atheists are
fairly uncommon. Aggregating across a number of separate studies, we find that
only about 5% of students indicate that they are atheists. These students have
an active atheist group on campus, meet regularly, and atheist students are
active in student governance.
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APPENDIX B
SURVEYS
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I created the following items, established scales include citations:
I read an article about how many Christians there are.
1. Yes
2. No
3. Not sure
I read an article about how many atheists there are.
1. Yes
2. No
3. Not sure
Please rate your agreement with the following statements using the scale below.
[Participants will rate these statements on a seven-point scale -3= strongly
disagree, 3= strongly agree]
Atheists are dishonest
Atheists are trustworthy
Atheists are not a threat as a group
Atheists are becoming powerful as a group
Atheists are becoming cohesive as a group
Please respond to the following prompt by typing your answer in the text entry
box below.
[Participants will type in their response]
How many atheists do you know?
Please rate your agreement with the following statements using the scale below.
[Participants will rate these statements on a seven-point scale -3= strongly
disagree, 3= strongly agree]
I often come into contact with atheists
I rarely come into contact with atheists
Please rate your agreement with the following items using the scale below.
[Negative attitudes towards atheist scale (Gervais, Shariff, 2010), participants will
rate their agreement with each item on a scale of -3= strongly disagree, 3=
strongly agree]
I would be uncomfortable with an atheist teaching my child
I strongly believe that church and state should not be kept separate
Societies function better if everyone believes in God
Religion facilitates moral behavior in a way that nothing else can
I would prefer to spend time with people who are religious believers
In order to check for careless responding please choose mostly disagree for this
item
I would not at all be bothered if the United States president did not have religious
beliefs
In times of crisis, I am more inclined to trust people who are religious.
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Please indicate on the below thermometer how you feel towards atheists. Higher
ratings indicate more “warm” feelings while low ratings indicate “cold” feeling.
[General attitudes thermometer. Participants will rate their “warmth” or “coldness”
towards atheists. There will be a scale of 1-100 for participants to indicate their
feelings towards atheists]
Please rate your agreement with the following statement using the scale below.
[Participants will rate these statements on a seven-point scale -3= strongly
disagree, 3= strongly agree]
I believe in God
Please rate your agreement with the following statement using the scale below.
[Participants will rate these statements on a seven-point scale -3= strongly
disagree, 3= strongly agree]
There cannot be morality without God.
Please rate your agreement with the following statement using the scale below.
[Participants will rate these statements on a seven-point scale -3= strongly
disagree, 3= strongly agree]
My religion is important to me
Demographic questions
Please respond to the following questions
[Participants will either select the answer that best describes them or type in their
response]
What is your age?
[Text entry box]
What is your gender?
1. Male
2. Female
3. Prefer not to answer
Please indicate the ethnicity that best describes you
White
Black or African American
American Indian or Alaska Native
Asian
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
Latino or Hispanic
Other
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What is your major? [Text entry box]
What year in school are you? [Text entry box]
Please rate your agreement with the following statements using the scale below.
[Participants will rate these statements on a seven-point scale -3= strongly
disagree, 3= strongly agree]
I tend to be more conservative than I am liberal.
I tend to be more liberal than I am conservative.
Please choose the option that best describes your political affiliation
[Participants will choose one option that best describes their political affiliation
with the option to not answer]
1. Democratic
2. Republican
3. No party affiliation
4. Prefer not to answer
Please rate your agreement with the following statement using the scale below.
[Participants will rate these statements on a seven-point scale -3= strongly
disagree, 3= strongly agree]
Atheists are the cause of moral decline in society (because of atheist influence
people have fewer morals)
Please answer the following questions:
[Participants will choose from the options below the questions]
Please use the text entry box below to tell us what you think this study was about
(Participants use text entry box, this will be used to see if they bought the
deception)
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